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A  reflection  on  the  existing  “constructs  of  knowledge”  on  Rwanda  reveals  that 
these  are  rife  with  contradictory  assertions  and  images.  We  therefore  map  “the  frontier  of 
knowledge  construction”,  the  centre(s)  of  society  where  not  only  policy  is  made,  but  where 
knowledge is actively construed, managed and controlled. We identify a discrepancy between 
“image”  and  “reality”  in/on  post-genocide  Rwanda.  We  do  so  to  be  able  to  address  the 
fundamental  question:  “do  we  really  understand  life  after  genocide?”  We  argue  that  crucial 
variables remain un- or under-explored due to an at times active interference in the scientific 
construction of knowledge; an overall cultivation of the aesthetics of progress and a culturally 
specific communication code. We analyze the “mise-en-sc￨ne” (stage-setting) of Rwanda and 
argue  for  greater  attention  to  the  “mise-en-sens”  (meaning-giving  and  overall  direction). We 
stress the need to carry out a  adopt a bottom-up perspective in order to capture the voices of 
ordinary people.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The  post-genocide  Rwandan  regime  is  often  hailed  for  its  remarkable  socio-
economic recovery after the total destruction it experienced in 1994. But the regime is also often 
portrayed as an increasingly authoritarian state with political dignitaries, ordinary people and 
members of the international community all submissive to the rules, regulations and discourses 
laid  out  for  them  as  in  a  „rehearsed  participation  in  public  affairs.‟  (African  Peer  Review 
Mechanism, 2005: 58). One can find the most divergent claims and conclusions on all themes 
constituting the post-conflict agenda: the justice-security-development nexus, while governance 
as an underlying factor cross-cuts the former three (Uvin, 2007: 41). The lack of consensus on 
the  post-conflict  achievements  and  essential  ingredients  of  Rwandan  society  signals  an 
apparent difficulty, if not impossibility, to separate image from reality, the imaginary from the 
real. 
 
   We undertook 20 months of fieldwork in rural Rwanda between 2004 and 
2008. This paper is a reflection on the practice of doing research in and on Rwanda. It is equally 
a reflection on the way knowledge is being generated in and on Rwanda.
1 A combination of 
obstacles encountered during our fieldwork necessitates this reflection. First and foremost there 
is the difficulty of gaining access to the “field”. The term “field” refers to the geographical area of 
Rwandan rural life where the majority of the population lives but also to the thematic domain of 
research  topics  such  as  ethnicity,  governance,  justice,  poverty,  inequality,  democracy  etc.  . 
These topics are, due to a range of reasons that we will explore in this paper, largely under- or 
unexplored  variables  in  post-genocide  Rwanda.  Secondly,  this  reflection  is  the  result  of  the 
experience of the sheer impossibility of communicating findings on the nature of rural life, and 
the  under-currents  of  social  processes  at  work,  to  the  urban  (foreign)  residents  of  Kigali. 
Rwanda‟s capital Kigali functions as the outpost of progress where Rwanda is presented and 
experienced as the beacon of hope, development and change on the African continent. Rwanda 
has indeed experienced a gigantic leap forward since the total destruction experienced in 1994. 
But we argue that some trends often remain hidden from view and can only be discerned when 
looking below the surface appearances. This is however a difficult exercise. 
 
  We start with the close examination of a text by Philip Gourevitch on the life 
after the genocide. This case-study is used to point out the difficulties in the understanding of 
post-genocide Rwanda. We highlight a general problem of taking the “mise-en-sc￨ne” (stage-
setting) for granted instead of actually capturing the “mise-en-sens” (meaning/overall direction). 
We  show  that  difficulties  in  interpretation  are  wide-spread  in  the  literature  on  Rwanda  in 
general.  We  ask  ourselves  the  question  of  why  it  is  difficult  to  come  to  a  balanced 
understanding of Rwanda and we question the reasons underlying the sheer impossibility of 
mapping  the  status  of  the  essential  ingredients  of  Rwandan  society.  We  argue    that  the 
cultivation of an aesthetics of progress; the  culturally specific ethics of dissimulation and an 
active  interference  in  the  „scientific‟  knowledge  construction  lie  at  the  heart  of  difficulties  in 
understanding life after genocide. 
                                                 
1 The nature of the knowledge construction in and on post-genocide Rwanda has previously been documented in Pottier 
(2002).   
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2.  GOUREVITCH’S “THE LIFE AFTER” AS CASE STUDY 
 
An example of the difficulties in understanding post-genocide Rwanda is the article 
by Philip Gourevitch on Rwanda entitled “The Life After” (Gourevitch, 2009a)
2. Gourevitch had 
been a reporter in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and published a widely 
read book (Gourevitch, 1999). His initial book was severely criticized for its one -dimensional 
understanding, or at least rendering, of things.  (Pottier, 2002: 56-57 & 168-169).
3 A 2009 trip 
brings him back to Rwanda where he, as the sub -title suggests, finds that “the reconciliation 
defies  expectations”  and  that  “there  is  a  possibility  of  peace”  as  he  concludes  in  the  last 
sentence of his piece. These claims, however, are the result of replacing reality with image, 
facts with discourse. Although Gourevitch has interesting and revealing encounters and insights 
during a trip in the countryside, he is unable (or unwilling) to use these experiences to start 
questioning the glittering surface appearances and the discourse of the new Rwandan elite. We 
will explore in more detail his interpretation of life after genocide to clarify the issue. The last 
section of his article deals with Rwanda‟s involvement in Congo, but we focus on the first part 
that deals with the situation inside Rwanda and where he „twists‟ the evidence to come to a 
conclusion that he cannot make.  
 
Gourevitch starts his article with a summing-up of the achievements of Rwanda‟s 
leadership and the positive trends in Rwandan society:  
 
“On the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, Rwanda is one of the safest and the most 
orderly countries in Africa. Since 1994, per-capita gross domestic product has nearly tripled, 
even  as  the  population  has  increased  by  nearly  twenty-five  per  cent,  to  more  than  ten 
million.  There  is  national  health  insurance,  and  a  steadily  improving  education  system. 
Tourism is a boom industry and a strong draw for foreign capital investment. In Kigali, the 
capital,  whisk-broom-wielding  women  in  frocks  and  gloves  sweep  the  streets  at  dawn. 
Plastic  bags  are  outlawed,  to  keep  litter  under  control  and  to  protect  the  environment. 
Broadband internet service is widespread in the cities, and networks are being extended into 
the countryside. Cell phones work nearly everywhere. Traffic police enforce speed limits and 
the mandatory use of seat belts and motorbike helmets. Government officials are required to 
be at their desks by seven in the morning. It is the only government on earth in which the 
majority  of  parliamentarians  are  women.  Soldiers  are  almost  nowhere  to  be  seen  […]” 
(Gourevitch, 2009a: 37-38) 
 
A bit further he adds a bucolic touch: 
 
“Where I remembered an empty valley overgrown with bush, there were now neatly planted 
fields  of  beans,  manioc,  and  sorghum,  dotted  with  men  hoeing  and  women  stooping  to 
harvest and reseed – a saw mill here, a livestock corral there. Old buildings were missing, 
new buildings were everywhere, and places where I‟d never seen anyone were crowded 
with  foot  traffic.  Much  was  familiar.  Indeed,  much  felt  eternal:  the  rise  and  fall  of  the 
sweeping, vaguely Tuscan vistas – rigorously terraced hills, pocked by low stands of banana 
trees and an occasional towering eucalyptus, with farmhouses clinging to the slopes, and 
                                                 
2 The theme developed in that article and the problems we discuss in this paper is even more „present „during his talk 
with  editor  of  the  New  Yorker.  The  audio  fragment  can  be  heard  at: 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/2009/05/04/090504on_audio_gourevitch (Last accessed: May 11, 2009.)  
3 See also the comparison of the books by Gourevitch and Alison Des Forges on Rwanda (Straus, 2000).  
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every so often an imposing red brick church on the summit, its bell tower cut against a hazy, 
cloud-spattered sky.” (Gourevitch, 2009a: 39). 
 
 So far, he in fact only describes what indeed can be seen in Rwanda. Either due 
to the fact that these evolutions are really taking place or due to the window-dressing activities 
we will discuss later on. And his descriptions of the Rwandan countryside are a combination of 
a fact of nature and his talent as a writer. More problems arise when he also assumes the 
claims by the Rwandan leaders that are usually his interlocutors and guides. Kagame himself 
tells him that “Ten million people now in this country have never been happier in the history of 
this country. It‟s better, Rwanda, far better than it has ever been. I have no doubt about that.” 
(Gourevitch,  2009a:  38).  Kagame  gives  him  the  task  “to  look  around,  go  around,  go  to  the 
villages”, and that if he fails “to see the sense of hope in their eyes, then I won‟t be telling you 
the truth.” (Gourevitch, 2009a:38). 
 
What he subsequently describes related to the Gacaca process and the perception 
of ordinary people on the Gacaca is what everybody who has spent a significant amount of time 
in the rural areas of Rwanda has to conclude: nobody likes Gacaca; it is not working very well 
and  it  is  not  bringing  reconciliation,  nor  justice.  The  „killer‟  Girumuhatse  explains  that 
reconciliation and confessions „is a program of the state‟.  Mariane, the survivor, dismisses the 
request  for  pardon  etc  as  „theatre‟,  a  performance  in  the  interest  of  the  state.  The  young 
survivor questioned by Kagame on „how he manages‟ in his neighborhood with the killers of his 
family  members  released  from  prison  says  in  fact  that  he  „is  not  managing  at  all‟.  He  just 
pretends to get along. Gourevitch‟s friend in Kigali confirms that „they talk about reconciliation, 
but that it is the reverse‟. Survivors hear about reconciliation on the radio, but it does not mean 
a lot to them since it will not bring back there family. So, the snapshot he took is rather bleak. 
And  it  is, indeed, only a snapshot. We will return  to both  issues, the bleak picture and  the 
snapshot approach. 
 
Fear, distrust and a lack of empathy for the others position are rife in the narratives 
collected by Gourevitch. The existence or signs of the existence of the opposite sentiments 
would be an indication of a “reconciliation process that defies expectations” as his title suggests. 
But Gourevitch did not find these sentiments. Nevertheless, through his overall tone, general 
descriptions as the  ones  quoted  above and failure  to take into  account the  meaning of the 
narratives collected he reverberates Kagame‟s claim that people have “never been happier”. 
Gourevitch gives priority to the overall, almost visual impressions he has when roaming Kigali 
and Rwanda. And he prioritizes the discourse laid out for him by his „elite‟ interlocutors and 
disregards the voices of ordinary people.  
 
Kagame  gives  him  the  task  “to  look  around,  go  around,  go  to  the  villages”. 
Gourevitch is at least honest when he says that, no, he “[…] didn‟t see any great hope in the 
eyes of the people I visited […]”(Gourevitch, 2009a:42). What he describes does indeed not 
allow him to come to this conclusion. Nevertheless, he tries to twist it around again: “ […] but 
when  I  travelled  around  Rwanda  there  was  a  greater  sense  of  ease  among  people  than  I 
remembered.” (Gourevitch, 2009a: 42) Again: he tries to align his experience with the dominant 
image and discourse fabricated in the centre of society.  „A greater sense of ease‟ than when? 
Than 1995-1996 probably. When he was there to write his first book. To no surprise:  they were 
still  virtually  killing  each  other  in  1995.  And  they  were  living  in  an  environment  of  total 
destruction and the absence of any functioning state structure or service delivery. Survivors  
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were still totally traumatized at that time and „non-survivors‟ (Hutu) were chased by RPF troops 
to either be killed or put in prison. Militias and other armed groups connected with the former 
regime made incursions into Rwanda from the camps in Congo to continue attacks against 
Tutsi.  In  that  sense,  yes,  it‟s  better  in  2009  than  during  the  genocide  or  the  immediate 
aftermath. 
 
Moreover, does he find any evidence in the periphery of society that Rwanda is 
“better than ever”, as Kagame suggest? Not really. The survivors say: it is better than twelve 
years ago. No surprise since they had just experienced the apocalypse 12 years earlier. But 
they add: “„economically, it was better before ‟94” (Gourevitch, 2009a: 42). Gourevitch raises 
the issue during his talk with Rwarakabije, the former military commander in the Rwandan army 
(FAR) under Habyarimana. And later he headed the armed rebellion (FDLR) against the new 
regime. Recently, he left the rebellion and joined the new Rwandan national army. The man 
does not even want to say anything when he is asked whether today is better than before the 
genocide. Instead, Gourevitch finds evidence that the mindset that structured the violence in 
1994 is still present and that a large part of the population does not feel „liberated‟ by the RPF 
military overthrow in 1994. To the contrary, they suggest that they expect a liberation from the 
RPF not by  the RPF. When Girumuhatse was in prison they hoped Hutu on  the outside of 
Rwanda  would  liberate  them.  Supposedly  not  only  from  prison  and  it  is  not  sure  that 
Girumuhatse does not continue to think the same nowadays. And Rwarakabije is still identifying 
himself with his former „job‟, his former „project‟ and his former „army‟ apparently. He continues 
to talk of „we‟ when he is referring to the FAR or FDLR although he is in the Rwandan Defense 
Forces (RDF) now. Does this not also mean that he not really feels part of that new project? 
Isn‟t this something else than „the possibility of peace‟ he is talking about at the end of his 
article? An attentive reader cannot be convinced or should at least ask these questions. 
 
Gourevitch  refers  to  the  fact  that  a  survivor  had  accused  Rwarakabije  of 
participation in the genocide during a commemoration ceremony with the president and other 
dignitaries present. These accusations were probably true. Kagame admits that Rwarakabije 
was nevertheless not processed in the post-genocide justice system. Since they needed him he 
was instead recycled in the new regime. It proves that the entire justice process is „political‟. 
How did it feel for the old man who raised the issue when the „big men‟ start laughing with his 
claim. That is where respect for survivors ends: when power is at stake. If ordinary Hutu would 
show this kind of disrespect - that would be „genocide ideology‟. And also here Gourevitch fails 
to fully appreciate the consequences of this insight. Does it not also mean that this politico-
justice system can change the „protected‟ status of people who are currently in the grace of the 
regime?  And  that  this  will  probably  be  the  case  when  they  stop  acting  as  puppets of  their 
masters? And what does this reveal about the entire justice system in Rwanda? And might this 
not be one of the reasons why reconciliation is not easily forthcoming? Is it not this attitude and 
approach  that  explains  the  sentiments  Gourevitch  uncovered  during  his  talks  in  the 
countryside? Is it not the facilitation of reconciliation and at the same its obstructing through 
these kind of actions that results in the status-quo he discovered? Gourevitch fails to ask these 
questions. 
 
 By asking these questions Gourevitch would start moving away from the centre of 
society where knowledge on Rwanda is constructed. He would be questioning the visible and 
he would start understanding the actual meaning and direction of life after genocide. But the 
reason why Gourevitch fails to ask these questions is not only due to unwillingness. It is also the  
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result of factors that make it hard to understand the meaning of life after genocide. A reason to 
bring them into focus here. 
 
3.   THE AESTHETICS OF PROGRESS OR “THE RWANDA WE CANNOT SEE” 
 
 Fellow journalist Kinzer endorses Gourevitch‟s approach when he claims that “the 
Rwanda that foreigners who live there see is the real one.” (Kinzer, 2008: 331)  Kinzer himself 
applies this principle with great rigor. A close examination of his work on  “A Thousand Hills” 
reveals that he does not speak with ordinary Rwandans but prefers to speak for them
4 based on 
what he sees. And hears, but mostly through the conversations he has with his  elite partners 
during his lengthy stay in the urban and posh environment of the Hotel Des Milles Collines. His 
assumption that the foreigners who stay in this urban environment see the real Rwanda is not 
really the case, for two reasons. Firstly, foreigners do not often cross the rural-urban divide and 
thus have a hard time grasping that world that lies beyond the outpost of progress, the capital 
Kigali and its aesthetics of modernity. Secondly, image control also implies an active pursuit and 
a  mastery  of  the  aesthetics  of  progress  of  which  some  features  are  transported  into  rural 
Rwanda.  
 
Most Rwandan observers and foreigners working in the country are reluctant to 
leave  the  beaten  track  and  never  really  cross  the  rural-urban  divide.  It  is  obvious  that  the 
occasional  visitor  is  often  even  more  confined  to  the  urban  sphere,  with  some  snapshot 
impressions from what lies beyond the capital city. There is an urban bias in the understanding 
of Rwanda. A global assessment of the working of the Department of International Development 
(DFID), the agency representing Rwanda‟s biggest donor - the United Kingdom - reveals that 
the staff stationed in Rwanda has the fewest working days outside the working station in the 
capital compared with any other DFID posts in the world! (National Audit Office, 2007: 27)
5 
DFID staff is only spending one day a year in rural areas, as few as the staff working in 
Afghanistan. However, there are without any doubt good reasons not to go into the countryside 
in Afghanistan.  And they are spending less than the two days staff are spending  in rural areas 
in Uganda or the ten days spent in the interior in Tanzania. The auditor recommends the overall 
necessity in all locations where DFID is present for regular “reality checks” to understand how 
their programmes are affecting poor peoples‟ lives.  
 
Such a “reality check” is not only almost totally absent in Rwanda up to today but 
also hard to undertake. An ambitious and internally coherent national ideology and vision on 
progress  is  translated  onto  the  rural  local  level.  Measures  are  not  only  taken  by  coercion 
irrespective  of  real-world  considerations  but  they  also  result  in  changes  in  image  and  not 
necessarily reality.
6 Table 1, for example, details a range of forbidden or compulsory activities.  
 
When considering the contents of the proposed measures, the underlying objective 
is clear: increasing the standards of health and hygiene, a laudable policy initiative in itself with -
without any doubt- also productive results. The consequence, however, is that a significant part 
                                                 
4 Susan Thomson pointed out that Kinzer speaks for ordinary Rwandans and not with them. Personal communication. 
5 A similar observation is made in an evaluation of the 2000 -2005 DFID country programme in Rwanda. A programme 
characterized as „insufficiently informed about implementation realities on the ground.‟ Kanyarukia et al, „Evaluation of 
DfiD Country Programmes: Country Study Rwanda 2000-2005‟, (DfID Evaluation report EV660, 2006, DfID, London). 
Cited in (Holvoet & Rombouts,  2008: 592). 
6 The fact that local authorities are appointed makes the chain of accountability go upwards towards higher authorities 
and not downwards to the population. As a result do the local administrative personnel implement orders received from 
the central government in Kigali. On the nature of the local governance structure see Ingelaere  (2007a: 36-41).   
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Table 1. System Of Fines Used To Implement Measures Improving General 
Wellbeing 
  Forbidden or Compulsory Activity  FINE (RWF) 
1    Tending livestock on „public places‟   10.000 
2    Cultivating on riverbeds   10.000 
3    Refusal to dig anti-erosion canals  10.000 
4    Absence of roof gutter and receptacle near house  10.000 
5    „Having‟ a second wife   10.000 
6    Churches without chapel (building)   10.000 
7    Religious groups praying at night   10.000 
8    Refusal to participate in nocturnal security patrols   10.000 
9    Parents who refuse to send children to school   10.000 
10    Teacher or other person sending child from school for not 
paying tuition fee  
10.000 
11    Consulting traditional „healer‟ without authorization   10.000 
12    Cutting trees without permission   10.000 
13    Heating wood to fabricate charcoal   10.000 
14    Selling wood products without authorization   10.000 
15    Refusal to make/use a „modern cooking stove‟   10.000 
16    Selling home made products like cheese, milk, etc, without 
authorization 
10.000 
17    House without compost bin   2.000 
18    House without clothesline   2.000 
19    House without closed toilet   2.000 
20    House without table to put cooking utensils   2.000 
21    House without conservation place for drinking water   2.000 
22    Someone without clean clothing & body hygiene   2.000 
23    Teacher without clean clothing & body hygiene   10.000 
24    Consumption of beers in cabarets or at home with straw   10.000 
25    Commercial centre without toilet   10.000 
26    Restaurant without toilets or not clean   10.000 
27    School compound not clean   10.000 
28    Health centre without hygiene   10.000 
29    Market with no toilets and/or not clean   10.000 
Source: Letter from a District Mayor addressed to the Executive Secretaries at the sector level - – Fieldwork observation 
June 2006 – Northern Province 
 
When considering the contents of the proposed measures, the underlying objective 
is  clear:  For  example,  the  clothing  rule  requires  that  everyone  wears  shoes  (Inkweto).  Not 
wearing  shoes  means  exclusion  from  public  places  such  as  markets  and  being  send  away 
during  official  government  reunions.  Peasants  cannot  live  up  to  these  demands  because  of 
financial limitations or because these measures deprive them from the basic needs to survive. 
Therefore,  sometimes,  they  end  up  in  the  local  cachot  (jail)  for  non-compliance.  Obligatory 
monetary  investments  or  fines  of  10.000  Rwandan  Francs  are  not  adjusted  to  the 
circumstances of rural life in the hills. The only strategy to regain freedom is to borrow money 
from  family  and  friends,  which  burdens  them  with  debts  and  thus  more  poverty.  Another 
strategy is to mimic the policy of image control. During fieldwork we noticed men and women 
walking  to  official  reunions  while  carrying  shoes  “on  their  heads”.  They  had  made  serious 
investments to buy new shoes as required by official policy and these monetary investments 
had, therefore, to be handled with the utmost caution and care to keep them “intact”. Only when 
                                                 
7 This theme is further developed in Ansoms (2009). The engineering aspect of the Rwandan post-genocide regime is 
also documented in the description of rural life on one hill in central Rwanda in Ingelaere (2006: 29-91).    
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approaching the area where government officials (sometimes together with foreigners coming to 
visit “the project” or something else “developmental”) were waiting them, would they put on their 
shoes. After the meeting and out of sight of the eyes of the state and possibly foreigners gazing 
on,  shoes  would  be  placed  on  the  head  to  walk  home  barefoot.  In  sum:  they  had  quickly 
mastered the ways to achieve the approval of state power in the microcosm of their rural hill. In 
a similar fashion did national authorities manipulate the gaze and endorsement of the world 
powers looking on: through the aesthetics of display. 
 
Gourevitch undertook a “reality-check” and went into the countryside. What he saw 
was real but without any doubt influenced by the cultivation of a positive image detailed above. 
Although it was important that he crossed the rural-urban divide, his trip into the countryside 
was nothing more than an occasional visit to one or a limited number of localities and one, or at 
best, some interviews.
8 It is however interesting to see that Gourevitch is very much aware of 
the  dangers  of  such  a  „snapshot‟  approach.  He  denounces  the  „snapshot‟  approach  in  his 
theoretical reflections on the Abu Ghraib events in Iraq in a piece entitled „The Abu Ghraib We 
Cannot See‟ (Gourevitch 2009b: 10)
9. He nevertheless fails to apply his own theory when he is 
trying  to  understand  Rwanda.  He  develops  a  sophisticated  reflection  on  the  limits  of 
photographs and isolated images when he discusses the atrocities in the Abu Ghraib prison and 
the fact that these were documented by photographs as snapshots of history. He notes: 
 
“Crime-scene photographs, for all their power to reveal, can also serve as a distraction, even 
a deterrent, from precise understanding of the events they depict. Photographs cannot show 
us a chain of command, or [...] decision making. Photographs cannot tell stories. They can 
only  provide  evidence  of  stories,  and  evidence  is  mute:  it  demands  investigation  and 
interpretation.” (Gourevitch 2009b: 10) 
 
It is clear that the notion “photographs” can be replaced with the “snapshot visit” to 
a  single  locality.  Gourevitch‟s  short  visit  to  the  hill  called  Taba  in  Rwanda,  indeed,  lacks 
investigation and interpretation. “Investigation” would mean placing the experience he has and 
the narratives he collects in the context of the locality of a living community (a hill) with a history, 
a social tissue and social groups, economic infrastructure and activities, a governance structure 
and power relations at work. “Investigation” would mean that one had to compare these insights 
gathered in that particular place with findings coming from other localities in Rwanda in order to 
establish the breadth of processes. It would allow for an understanding of the “field” instead of 
ceding the “field” to the discourse of the most important political player(s). We have pointed out 
above that it is exactly the latter that Gourevitch does in his piece on the life in post-genocide 




                                                 
8 It would be important to also discuss the presence of the journalist/researcher on the spot and the actual interview 
procedures. Note that Gourevitch‟s translator replies to a statement of Girumuhatse with “yeah, they all say that.” If this 
intervention took place in the presence of the interlocutor it is, of course, unacceptable. Such a statement uttered by a 
Rwandan translator will without any doubt send a signal to the respondent and influence the perception he has of the 
interviewer and the answers he „needs‟ to give.  
9 I would like to thank David Newbury for bringing my attention to this op -ed contribution. The implications of the 
reflection on photography it has for Gourevitch‟s article on the life after genocide in Rwanda were suggested by David 
Newbury.  
Do we understand life after genocide?  IOB Working Paper / 2009.02 - 13 -     
4.   THE ETHICS OF DISSIMULATION: THE REPORTER AT LARGE CAUGHT IN THE 
FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
  
The control of the aesthetics of display and progress results in the fact that the 
images  one  contemplates  when  roaming  the  country  turn  out  to  be  superficial  and  thus 
misleading.  For example when cruising the central boulevards of Kigali or on the rare occasion 
of “passing” the countryside to visit “the project” or attend “a seminar” in the provincial towns of 
Gisenyi  or  Butare.  Undertaking  a  “reality  check”  requires  an  unconstrained  period  in  rural 
Rwanda to collect “stories” if one were to develop a bottom-up perspective on essential features 
of  contemporary  Rwandan  society,  going  beyond  official  discourse  and  window-dressing. 
However, an additional difficulty arises; something much more subtle and resulting from the fact 
that  a  particular  ideological  framework  is  widely  propagated  in  the  countryside  during 
awareness campaigns and during meetings with authorities and military commanders. This has 
installed a far-reaching self-censorship among the population with regard to elements that do 
not fit into the official „public transcript‟. Official policy not only controls the hygiene of bodies, 
but  also  the  hygiene  of  minds.  Although  this  is  a  legitimate  concern  considering  the  hate 
campaign that engulfed the country in the beginning of the nineties, but “re-education” often 
also involves “political indoctrination”.
10  
 
When de Lame conducted fieldwork in the late 80s she stated that meetings in the 
Rwandan  socio-cultural  universe  –  whether  festive  communions,  ritualized  public  drinking 
activities, or “politico-private” gatherings – „serve to transmit meaning, provide the instruments 
of memorization, and create consensus.‟ (de Lame, 2005: 303).  This bias for consensus was 
only enhanced after the 1994 genocide, given efforts to restore order and maintain security. The 
violence experienced during the 1994 genocide and war from 1990 destroyed the Rwandan 
social fabric; the result is that distrust is pervasive.  There has followed a zealous campaign to 
eradicate  “genocide  ideology”  (Republic  of  Rwanda,  2006).
11  Sensitization  campaigns, 
commemoration ceremonies, speeches by dignitaries and re -education programmes, the so-
called Ingando and Intorero, needs to adjust the desired image of Rwanda.
12 These endeavors 
to control people‟s thoughts are not only taking place on specific occasions during retreats or 
yearly gatherings but have become a continued process. The weekly Umuganda communal 
labor  activities  taking  place  at  the  local  level  concludes  with  a  discourse  pronounced  by 
centrally appointed, but locally operating leaders on a theme chosen by the government and 
even published in the “official gazette”. All of this has instilled a high degree of self-censorship 
among  the  Rwandan  peasant  population.
13  We  identify  the  vectors  of  this  “rehearsed 
consensus”. 
 
On the  one  hand there  is the  idea, ideology  of  Rwandanicity or Rwandanness, 
meaning that Rwandans were one before the arrival of colonialism (Republic of Rwanda, 2006a: 
167-185). Colonial powers created ethnic groups out of a harmonious and equal society to rule 
on the basis of these divisions. The creation of these divisions was the starting point of the 
genocide  culminating  in  the  1994  mass  slaughter  of  Tutsi.    A  second  vector  is  the  idea  of 
                                                 
10 On the thin line between re-education and indoctrination see Mgbako (2005).  
11 Republic of Rwanda,  Genocide Ideology and Strategies for its Eradication, (Government of Rwanda, Kigal, 2006). 
Footnote 5 to 7 in the report (p. 17) gives concrete examples of instances of “genocide ideology” and reveals its wide-
ranging scope. 
12 For a detailed discussion of this ideological framework during the Gacaca activities see Ingelaere (2007b & 2009) 
13 The Kinyarwandan word Kwibwizira entails this idea of auto-censorship. It expresses the image that people do what 
authorities want them to do without the latter asking them to do so or without using coercion.  
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“liberation”. The RPF stopped this divisionism not only in its deadly manifestation during the 
actual  killings  in  1994  but  also  through  its  policies  in  the  post-genocide  period.  The  RPF 
abolished ethnicity and created one big “family” (umuryango) for all Rwandans. The “genocide 
ideology” is the third vector. Negative forces are still present in and outside Rwanda continuing 
to embrace the old and longstanding genocidal tendencies. Guidance from within the liberation 
movement of the RPF is necessary to fully embrace the new regained order of Rwandanicity 
and “consensual democracy”, free from the perils of ethnicity and the whims of dictatorship. 
  
This  “rehearsed  consensus”  is  the  dominant  and  dominating  discourse  in  post-
genocide  Rwanda.  While  an  outsider  to  Rwanda  and  Rwandan  culture  would  consider  the 
message(s) that are part of this “rehearsed consensus” as true or as referring to an existing 
reality, they are not necessarily experienced as referring to an existing reality by Rwandans. An 
understanding  of  the  cultural  conception  of  the  ubwenge  is  however  necessary  to  fully 
appreciate the nature of communication in Rwanda.
14 This complex notion incorporates a range 
of elements. In the broadest sense does it refer to intelligence resulting in self -controlled public 
acts. Apart from an overall principle structuring behavior and display,  ubwenge also refers to a 
specific way of communicating. In the traditional organization of Rwandan society did speech 
acts not only correspond with reality. What one said did not necessarily correspond with what 
one thought. It was the status connection between the interlocutors or the broader relationship 
with the socio-political environment surrounding the interlocutors that needed to be served in 
the communication. The word was a means to an end, not so much an end in itself. From a 
Judeo-Christian and western perspective would the latter be the truth and the former a lie. But 
in  the  Rwandan  context  did  and  do  truth  and  lies  stand  in  a  dialectical  relationship.  The 
Rwandan system of communication was (and is) esoteric: statements at the same time reveal 
and conceal. 
 
 Often, outsiders to Rwandan culture fail to take this into account. As Gourevitch 
rightly points out in his op-ed on the documenting of American atrocities in Iraq, snapshots (be it 
pictures or occasional visits to the countryside) “[…] can only provide evidence of stories … 
[they] demand investigation and interpretation.” (Gourevitch, 2009b: 10). Especially when one is 
aware that reality is not necessary that what one is told it is. The nature of the interpretation of 
life  after  genocide  would  improve  when  taking  this  communication  code  into  account.  In 
addition, one could for example consult the results of carefully conducted fact-finding mission or 
scientific research undertaken by internationally respected institutions. But also in this „genre‟ 
Rwanda is characterized by a multitude of findings and interpretations. We provide an overview 
of some of the results of this difficult exercise.  
 
5.   UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE-GOVERNANCE-DEVELOPMENT IN RWANDA: A 
DIFFICULT EXERCISE. 
 
The tension we identified in Gourevitch‟s work is often observed when comparing 
the writings on Rwanda.
15 We provide some examples. After the consolidation of the political 
transition through the 2003 presidential elections, Reyntjens observed „cosmetic operations for 
international consumption‟ in the realm of governance and he summarized the nature of the 
                                                 
14  Apart  from  our  own  field  experience  and  information  gathered  during  fieldwork  we  rely  on:  de  Lame  (2004);  
Rukebesha, (1985) Overdulve, (1997); Ntampaka,(1999); Lestrade (1972); Crepeau, (1985). 
15 Moreover, he would need to adopt another “method”. Currently he operates as a writer looking for interesting stories, 
generalizing from the particular. David Newbury pointed out this issue in an e-mail conversation with René Lemarchand.  
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regime that came about as a dictatorship, an environment that is „a fertile breeding ground for 
structural  violence‟  that  might  lead  to  „acute  violence‟  (Reyntjens,  2004:  210).  But  Stephen 
Kinzer finds the opposite of such a „closed and repressive place‟ in 2008 when he concludes his 
„progress report‟ on the achievements of post-genocide Rwanda and the role of its leader, Paul 
Kagame. He is convinced that Rwanda will not descend into hell again but, instead, it even 
„seems  at  least  possible‟  that  Rwanda  will  be  pulled  out  of  poverty  „in  a  generation  or  so‟ 
through, among other things, „visionary leadership‟ (Kinzer, 2008). World Bank researchers also 
noted in 2003 that „considerable progress has been achieved over the last ten years in a range 
of  areas‟  (World  Bank,  2004:  1).  The  report  signals  a  macro-level  economic  recovery  and 
concludes that although efforts will have to be made „social indicators are clearly improving for 
Rwanda‟s next generation‟ (World B  ank,  2004:  1).  Ansoms  (2008)  however  questioned  the 
fact whether this better future for Rwanda‟s next generation will also include the mass of rural 
poor since growth-policies turn out to be not so pro-poor as the rhetoric suggest, an argument 
that  is  underscored  by  survey  results  revealing  growing  inequality  since  2002  (Republic  of 
Rwanda, 2006).  
 
The World Bank report (2004) also refers to significant steps forward in the domain 
of reconciliation and asserts that the Gacaca court system has been „instrumental in advancing 
reconciliation and accountability following the genocide.‟ The post-genocide Rwandan way of 
dealing with the past, and the Gacaca process in particular, received wide attention as well, 
often  with  the  same  diverging  analysis.  Clark  (2007)  argues  that  the  hybrid  nature  of  the 
Gacaca system is an asset to the process, while others identify it as the weakest link in the 
system  (Ingelaere,  2008:  25-29).  Some  argue  that  the  Gacaca  process  not  only  fosters 
reconciliation,  but  instigates  a  democratic  culture  of  deliberation  and  dialogue  as  well 
(Wierzynska:  2004),  while  others  see  Gacaca  as  „an  exercise  in  victor‟s  justice,  coercing 
participation,  restricting  freedom  of  speech  on  sensitive  subjects,  and  collectivizing  guilt‟ 
(Waldorf, 2006: 85). While a minister in 2007 claimed that 75% of Rwandans „are reconciled‟ 
(The New Times, 12 April 2007), others disqualified the reconciliation process stating that post-
genocide  justice  in  Rwanda  comes  down  to  a  return  to  the  feudal  period  with  slavery  and 
subordination for Hutu (Centre de lute contre l‟impunti￩ et l‟injustice au Rwanda, 2005). In a 
more recent discussion on the nature of the  Rwandan justice system Human Rights Watch 
concluded after three years of research  that the judicial system operates in a political context 
„[…] where there is an official antipathy to views diverging from those of the government and the 
dominant  party‟  (Human  Rights Watch,  2008,  2).  An  element  that  is  detrimental  to  fair  trial 
guarantees. Schabas undertook the same exercise and refutes most of the claims by Human 
Rights Watch and typified certain perspectives on Rwanda as „[…] unrealistic assessments of 
problems that are more imaginary than real‟ (Shabas, 2008, 59).  
 
Considering the diverging accounts detailed above, the question arises: is this the 
same  country?    The  lack  of  consensus  on  the  post-conflict  achievements  and  essential 
ingredients of Rwandan society signals an apparent difficulty, if not impossibility, of separating 
image from reality, and isolating the imaginary from the real. Even in well-researched reports 
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6.   THE “SCIENTIFIC” CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: FOUR EXAMPLES  
 
In some cases, the differences in understanding of Rwanda and conclusions on the 
achievements  in  the  post-genocide  period  can  simply  be  attributed  to  a,  often  politically 
motivated, hidden agenda that necessitates the “twisting” of the evidence or the selectivity in the 
sources.  An  example  is  the  pseudo-scientific  document  presented  by  the  new  “friends  of 
Rwanda”.
16  The text is minimizing the short-comings in important governance issues in current 
Rwanda.  At the same time is the nature and scale of the violence and human rights abuses 
committed by the RPF rationalized. But the previous regime also has its „friends‟ that are as 
selective in their sources and as biased in their reading of history. Some deliberately minimize 
what happened in Rwanda in 1994; take shortcuts one cannot possible take when identifying 
the onus of responsibility for the 1994 carnage and fail to acknowledge the improvements since 
the years of total destruction (Péan, 2005). These writings are easily unmasked as “motivated” 
and “biased”.  
 
We  leave  aside  the  more  fact-finding  oriented  approaches.  Fact-finding  reports 
often  give  rise  to  controversy  and  receive  an  almost  standardized  denial  in  response  when 
conclusions  are  not  in  line  with  official  discourse.
17  We  focus  on  large -scale  research 
undertakings labeled „scientific‟. Or at least where there is a consensus that the findings were 
derived through a scientifically sound procedure. Deniability is more difficult, intervention more 
complex. It nevertheless happens. 
 
A first problem is related to the fact that the understanding of Rwanda focuses on 
the  genocide  and  is  dominantly  “top-down”.  Since  mid  1994,  dozens  of  works  have  been 
published on Rwanda. As Peter Uvin phrases it: “[…] There has been an explosion of writing on 
this  hitherto  almost  unknown  country”  (Uvin,  2001:  76).  Most  address  one  or  more  of  the 
elements to understand or explain the genocide. Longman identifies the need to conduct local-
level  research  in  order  to  further  substantiate  insights  on  different  aspects  related  to  the 
Rwandan genocide in general (Longman: 2004). What is lacking is a systematic investigation 
and analysis of the micro-level processes at work in smaller communities in Rwanda (Uvin, 
2001: 97-98). This is however not only the case for the genocide but especially for the post-
genocide period. Much work needs to be done but nevertheless did the results of studies and 
research projects on a range of post-conflict reconstruction issues become available over the 
past  years. Rwanda is heavily researched compared to, for example, neighbouring Burundi. 
This attention is the result of its dramatic history that is almost mediagenic and thus interesting. 
The fact that the country is highly efficiently organized also contributes to the fact that research 
is rife. Administrative structures are branched deep into rural life. All of this makes it possible to 
initiate  large-scale  research  projects  of  all  sorts.  Rwanda  is  equally  a  research  heaven  for 
smaller projects often undertaken by master students. The relative regime stability and the good 
security  situation  (the  absence  of  war  and  other  forms  of  physical  violence)  functions  as 
necessary pre-requisites for most research activities. But the knife cuts both ways. The fact that 
the state apparatus functions as a well-oiled machine also results in the omnipresence of the 
ears and eyes of the state to control what is and can be researched.  
 
                                                 
16  Friends  of  Rwanda,  “Passing  Through  the  Fire.  Rebuilding  Rwanda  after  the  1994  genocide.”  See: 
http://www.friendsofrwanda.com/ (Last Accessed May 10, 2009). 
17 Examples are abundant, to give just one: „Mixed Reactions on MHC report‟, The New Times, Kigali, 10 October 2008.  
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 The main difficulty to come to a balanced understanding of life after genocide is 
thus not so much practical or  organizational in nature but related to the fact that  Rwandan 
politics actively controls the (scientific) knowledge production when deemed necessary by the 
regime and whenever possible, as previously also documented by Pottier (2004).
18 On several 
occasions in the recent period there has been active interference in (the interpretation of) 
scientific research to guarantee the propagation of an image in line with the official „vision‟ and 
to make sure deviating „knowledge‟ would remain unknown.
19   
 
We provide four examples of where this has taken place. The first two are known 
since findings were made public but refuted; in the latter two cases interference occurred before 
results  were made public (and the consequence  was that research findings  were not made 
known).  
 
The World Food Programme. In the first months of 2006, a famine struck the food 
economy  zone  of  Bugesera  located  in  Northern  Burundi  and  Southern  Rwanda.  The World 
Food Programme issued a report with alarming figures based on research undertaken by the 
organization.
20 The Burundian government acknowledged the problem, demanded assistance 
from international aid agencies and urged Burundians to help their fellow compatriots in need.
21  
Even though this is an agricultural and climatic zone shared by both countries, the response of 
Rwandan officials was to refute the claims and to argue that the data were incorrect.
22 A report 
by the International Federation of the Red Cross  (2007) only released in 2007 reveals that the 
Red Cross launched an emergency appeal to assist vulnerable families in the same period. 
Eventually action was undertaken and food distribution took place. Mo reover, the author of this 
paper was undertaking field research at the time in villages located in that part of Rwanda. 
Hunger was rife among the population. Some people were eating grass and other weeds due to 
a lack of food. This firsthand  evidence subst antiates the claims of the WFP report. This 
suggests that the reason the report and the existence of hunger were denied by the Rwandan 
government  was  not  so  much  a  consequence  of  relying  on  “incorrect  data”  as  seeking  to 
promote a vision of a self-sufficient, efficient country, where there was progress and the desire 
to propagate this vision to the outside world. Hunger could not form a comfortable part of this 
picture, so in reality it had to be denied.
23 
 
The United Nations. The Human Development Report issued by the UNDP and 
entitled Turning Vision 2020 into Reality. From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development 
acknowledged  the  fact  that  Rwanda  experienced  substantial  growth  since  the  end  of  the 
genocide. The report states that the global  Millennium Development Goals or  the Rwandan 
equivalent “Vision 2020” might be reached in the future. However some serious shortcomings 
                                                 
18 We focus on scientific research in this paper and leave aside the fact that also the freedom of the press is under 
pressure in Rwanda. See Waldorf (2007). 
19 One also has to take into account that one needs to have permission of the necessary governmental bodies to 
conduct field research. Therefore, certain research activities are never undertaken or tremendously adapted to predict 
outcomes because (initially) not in line with the official policy and “vision”. Apart from the examples referred to here and 
involving  international  (research)  institutions  several  examples  can  be  cited  of  researchers  who  in  the  context  of 
academic research – Phd. or other – ran into serious trouble in Rwanda, especially while doing research with “ordinary 
people”  in  the  countryside.  A  researcher  was  forced  to  undergo  a  re-education  tour  after  having  presented  the 
intermediary results of her findings based on fieldwork with ordinary Rwandans. See Thomson (2009).  
20 ‟1.8 Burundians face grave food crisis‟, PANAPRESS, 19 January 2006.  
21 „Nkurunziza urges Burundians to assist famine victims‟, PANAPRESS, 20 February 2006. 
22 ‟Hunger: Government refutes WFP claims‟, The New Times, Kigali, 14 Mai 2006. 
23 Filip Reyntjens refers to this way of handling things as „a characteristic of dictatorships more  interested in their 
international image then the survival of their population‟. (Reyntjens, 2007: 6) (translation by the author).  
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and crucial challenges were identified, including a rise in absolute poverty, in inequality levels 
and the need for much greater investment in the agricultural sector.  The quality of governance 
and depth of democracy also needed to be improved to guarantee long-term stability, according 
to the UNDP. This report was “not accepted” by the Rwandan cabinet. The minister in charge of 
economy was asked to refute the report.  He promptly did so, even after having previously 
written the introduction to the report. The UNDP was pressured to release a statement admitting 
the report contained unfounded and misleading information. The lead researchers – a Rwandan 
and foreign national – were blacklisted.
24  
 
The  National  Unity  and  Reconciliation  Commission.  For  several  years  the 
National  Unity  and  Reconciliation  Commission  (NURC)  has  been  undertaking  large-scale 
surveys on factors affecting social cohesion and reconciliation. This work has been undertaken 
through  a  specialized  INGO  and  is  financed  by  important  donors.    As  the  results  of  initial 
surveys became available after some time, the study design was adapted in such a way that 
longer-term changes could be identified concerning specific themes and topics in the research.  
From  the  start  of  the  Gacaca  activities  nationwide  in  2005,  however,  these  survey  results 
stopped being disseminated to a wider audience. The official reason given for not releasing the 
findings was that the intention existed to bundle the findings with the aim of presenting several 
years‟ findings together to produce a more “comprehensive oversight”. However, there is one 
version of the report circulating in diplomatic circles and that reveals that findings themselves 
are  more  probable  the  cause  for  these  “delays”.  This  unauthorized  report  reveals  a  critical 
assessment of the impact of Gacaca activities on social cohesion and reconciliation in Rwanda 
in 2005-2006; this finding is also not in accordance with the dominant discourse on the Gacaca 
process  that  the  government  wishes  to  make  known  and  most  probably  the  reason  why  a 
release was initially “postponed” (Republic of Rwanda, 2007). Strangely enough, in the same 
period and with result not being released, a minister refers to statistics from the NURC when he 
asserts that 75% of the population has reconciled.
25 But eventually an official report was made 
public in 2008 most probably since the existence (not the contents) of these survey  results was 
known. The increasing request by donors interested in social developments in the country and 
NGOs working in the domain of reconciliation necessitated the release of the findings. The 
report reveals the main results already reflected in the pr evious unauthorized version and 
depicts  -  apart from some positive evolutions related to specific themes  -  an overall bleak 
picture of the impact of the Gacaca process on social cohesion. Its release was not widely 
publicized and thus went unnoticed to a wider audience (Republic of Rwanda, 2008).  
 
Moreover, the report concludes with the assertion that  “it is important for analysts 
and policymakers to properly “read” these sentiments, triangulate them with other information or 
data that this survey cannot provide” (Republic of Rwanda, 2008: 79). A footnote suggests that 
especially 'qualitative individual interviews or focus groups‟ could provide important additional 
insights. A strange suggestion, since this has been undertaken in 2006 by the same NURC and 
its  logistical  partner  in  order  to  better  understand  the  quantitative  results.
26  But the remark 
becomes meaningful when considering the fact that the findings were not made public because 
of “ideological” or “political” reasons.  The results of the qualitative research provided useful 
                                                 
24 „I did not read UN report before launch – Musoni‟, The New Times,  24 August 2007. 
25 „75 percent of population have reconciled -  James Musoni‟, The New Times, Kigali, 12 April 2007. 
26 Author‟s interview with a Rwandan field researcher part of the „qualitative‟ research group and study. The qualitative 
study and the existence of the results were confirmed by an official of the National Service of the Gacaca courts – 
Interview, Kigali, April 2007. A field guide with questions used during focus group discussions is on file with the author.  
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insights  in  the  reasons  of  some  overall  unexplored  tendencies  and  unexpected  negative 
opinions by survivors or prisoners. Narratives from the qualitative research gave insight in the 
reasons why 80% of respondents questioned the veracity of testimonies in Gacaca in the 2006 
survey. But a government official responded that the findings gathered during these focus group 
discussions to elucidate why people thought the truth was not surfacing in the Gacaca activities 
was irrelevant. The government departed from “the people that are of the opinion that the truth 
surfaces in Gacaca and Rwanda.”
27 End of research. 
 
The World Bank. In 2005, the World Bank embarked on a heavily financed and 
innovative multi-country study of micro-level and longitudinal determinants of movements out of 
poverty. The idea was to replicate research design, methodology and apply similar questions 
across different countries and thus to allow for cross-country comparisons to be made. Rwanda 
was one of the countries selected for the research, together with Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, 
Mexico, India, Afghanistan and China, among others.
28 An underlying idea of this research was 
to explore the “expansion of freedoms” developed by Amartya Sen (1999), the exercise of basic 
rights and the ability to participate in democratic institutions in different countries. The study 
used survey techniques capturing and comparing longitudinal data from before the genocide 
and  2005.  It  was  also  based  on  qualitative  interviews  and  observations  on  participatory 
decision-making at local and national levels. After six months of study and the collection of 
hundreds of survey questionnaires and numerous other primary data sources the government 
security forces seized  at  least half of the data on  the  pretext  of the presence of “genocide 
ideology” in the research design and study content.
29 Rwandan enumerators were questioned 
by the police and foreign researchers implementing the study were summoned by the Criminal 
Investigations Department (CID). After a long period of negotiations between high-level World 
Bank representatives and several Rwandan ministries, ministers and other government officials, 
the decision was taken to destroy all data and abandon the research project altogether. It was 
clear that the results of the research could be harmful for the Rwandan establishment since 
questions on democracy and freedom were central to the study, while the longitudinal set-up 
made a comparison between pre- and post-genocide Rwanda possible, but apparently this was 
seen  as  undesirable  in  case  unfavorable  comparisons  arose.  The  raw  data  were  never 
analyzed because destroyed. 
 
7.   CONCLUSION: FROM THE MISE-EN-SCÈNE (STAGE-SETTING) TO THE 
MISE-EN-SENS (PUTTING INTO MEANING/DIRECTION) 
 
An active interference in the scientific knowledge construction implies that even the 
reports one reads in the offices in Kigali, or Washington, New York, London, Brussels, The 
Hague,  Copenhagen  or  other  capitals  around  the  globe,  are  not  always  as  complete  as 
expected.  The  above  are  four  related  –  but  separate  -  instances  of  explicit  and  manifest 
„information management‟ (Reyntjens, 2004: 197) which took place in terms of the scientific 
construction of knowledge. These practices further underscore Pottier‟s (2002: 207) observation 
that “reality is what Rwanda‟s political leaders, as moral guardians tell the world what it is.” The 
                                                 
27 Interview with official of the National Service of the Gacaca Courts, April 2007. 
28 The author was employed as a long term consultant for the World Bank stationed in Rwanda at the time, supervising 
together with two other foreign researchers the design and implementation of the study and the fieldwork activities in the 
Rwandan countryside. 
29 The study was not stopped by a dialogue between the government of Rwanda and the World Bank, but by ordering 
police officers and other security agents to place a significant part of the enumerators and logistical partners employed 
by the World Bank under police surveillance after seizing all the data carriers these people had in their possession.  
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Rwandan  establishment  operating  in  the  centre  of  society  is  keen  on  getting  the  preferred 
image of Rwanda get adopted. As we have shown it actively pursues this objective in various 
ways through controlling knowledge construction: through the active interference in scientific 
research projects; through the cultivation of the aesthetics of progress and through the subtle 
use of a complex communication code.  
 
Any attempt to understand post-genocide Rwanda needs to be aware of the “mise-
en-sc￨ne” we analyzed in this paper.  Future attempts to generate insights on post-genocide 
Rwanda require innovative approaches if they are to produce useful results.  One has to move 
beyond the „mise-en-scène‟ and towards the „mise-en-sens‟: the meaning of life in the periphery 
of Rwandan society and the overall direction post-genocide Rwanda takes. 
   
 In Rwanda, there is a second world lying beyond political control or correctness, 
beyond „rehearsed consensus‟ and the „mise-en-scène‟. There is the need to carry through a 
„copernican turn‟ in the knowledge construction on Rwanda by replacing a focus on the centre 
with  insights  from  the  periphery.  The  acts  of  „investigation‟  Gourevitch  deems  necessary  to 
arrive at a „deep‟ or „thick‟ interpretation of the life after should thus result in an approach and 
research activities that go well beyond „the outpost of progress‟. Understanding the process of 
living  the  Rwandan  political  transition  from  one  regime  into  another  and  from  „peace‟  over 
„violence‟ into „peace‟ again will have to take into account the particular „forces of circumstance‟. 
In any case it needs to go beyond the single visit and the personal, literary reflection. Taking all 
the above-mentioned obstacles into account, one of the most important options available is to 
undertake lengthy and repeated periods in the field far away from the centre of society, the use 
of adapted research techniques, a substantial amount of primary data and experiences and a 
thorough understanding of the socio-political and cultural context one is working in. And this to 
capture not only trustworthy statements but especially certain undercurrents of social processes 
at work, the hitherto unobserved variables. In general, these undercurrents will only come to the 
surface during „rare moments of political electricity when […] the hidden transcript is spoken 
directly and publicly in the teeth of power‟ (Scott, 1990: 14) In the absence of such events, one 
has to find an interpretation of the „cryptic and opaque‟ (Scott, 1990: 137). It is a difficult, but 
necessary exercise.    
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